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**IN THE  
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA**

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DANIEL REED,	)	
	)	
Appellant-Defendant,	)	
	)	
vs.	)	No. 49A02-0607-CR-558
	)	
STATE OF INDIANA,	)	
	)	
Appellee-Plaintiff.	)	

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APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT  
The Honorable Clark Rogers, Judge  
Cause No. 49G16-0605-CM-79130

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**March 13, 2007**

**MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION**

**KIRSCH, Judge**

Daniel Reed appeals his conviction for battery<sup>1</sup> as a Class A misdemeanor and raises one issue, which we restate as whether sufficient evidence was presented to support his conviction.

We affirm.

### **FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY**

On March 11, 2006, Christina Coffey visited her cousin (who is Reed's wife) at her Marion County home. Reed and his wife began to argue in the living room, and the wife threatened to call the police. Their argument continued in an adjacent bathroom. The wife called out to Coffey for help. Coffey went into the bathroom to find Reed standing over his wife. Coffey attempted to pull Reed off of his wife. Reed then asked Coffey if she "want[ed] some too." *Tr.* at 9. When Coffey tried to escape from the bathroom, Reed grabbed her by the hair and slammed her head against a doorframe. Reed threw the only phones available to the victims out into the yard and then fled the scene. Coffey went to a neighbor's house and contacted the police. Reed was charged with Class A misdemeanor battery and found guilty after a bench trial. Reed now appeals.

### **DISCUSSION AND DECISION**

When we review a claim of insufficient evidence, we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of the witnesses. *Abney v. State*, 858 N.E.2d 226, 228 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). We consider only the evidence and all reasonable inferences favorable to the judgment. *Id.* We will affirm the conviction unless we conclude that no reasonable factfinder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. *Id.*

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<sup>1</sup> See IC 35-42-2-1(a)(1).

To convict Reed of battery, the State was required to prove that Reed: (1) knowingly; (2) touched another person in a rude, insolent, or angry manner; (3) that resulted in bodily injury to another person. IC 35-42-2-1.

Reed argues that the State did not present sufficient evidence to support his conviction for battery. He specifically claims that the evidence did not establish that he knowingly touched Coffey in a rude, insolent or angry manner. He contends that the touch was an accident. He asserts that when Coffey attempted to pull him off his wife, he raised up with force, which resulted in Coffey losing her balance and falling.

The evidence at trial was sufficient for the trial court to conclude that Reed knowingly touched Coffey in a rude, insolent, or angry manner. Uncorroborated testimony of a single witness is sufficient to sustain a conviction on appeal. *Seketa v. State*, 817 N.E.2d 690, 696 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). Here, Coffey testified that when she entered the bathroom and attempted to help her cousin, Reed asked, “you want some, too?” *Tr.* at 9. Coffey further testified that, “[Reed] grabbed me by my ponytail and smashed my head into the doorframe.” *Id.* The testimony of Officer Lepsky, who arrived at the residence after the incident, confirmed that the injury appeared to have been caused by a “direct blunt force.” *Id.* at 40.

If the testimony believed by the trier of fact is enough to support the conviction, then the reviewing court will not disturb it. *Ferrell v. State*, 746 N.E.2d 48, 51 (Ind. 2001). In this case, the trial court believed Coffey’s testimony, and her testimony was sufficient to support a conviction for battery.

Affirmed.

RILEY, J., and FRIEDLANDER, J., concur.

